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COMPUTER LAW: AN OVERVIEW
by David C. Tunick *
Since World War II, computer use has increased dramatically.'
Computers2 are now used in such diverse activities as accounting, hotel
and airline reservations, 3 subway and ship movement, traffic light tim-
ing,4 bank check processing,5 credit bureau information storage,6 space
mission control, manufacturing processes, patient monitoring in hospi-
tals, newspaper printing, and even in the design of other computers.7
* B.A., 1963 (University of California at Los Angeles); J.D., 1971 (University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles). Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. This increased use is discussed in Bigelow, The Lawyer's Role in the Computer Age,
[1972-1979 Transfer Binder] 1 COMPUTER L. SERV. § 1-1, at 1-4 (R. Bigelow ed.) [hereinafter
cited as Bigelow].
2. It is appropriate to define "computer" to assure that the scope of this article is clear.
Unfortunately, there is no unanimous agreement as to the meaning of "computer." See, e.g.,
C. MEEK, GLOSSARY OF COMPUTING TERMINOLOGY 52 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MEEK],
which provides four definitions of "computer."
In the materials prepared by the author for his law school course, Computers and the
Law, the author defines "computer" by the functions it is capable of performing. Six func-
tions have been found to be shared by devices commonly accepted as "computers." First of
all, a computer is capable of containing a stored program, ie., the computer program can be
input into the computer so that the computer becomes capable of analyzing data without
human intervention. Second, a computer has branching capability such that the computer
program has a choice of following more than one path of instructions, depending upon the
nature of the data input to the computer. Third, a computer does arithmetic operations, ie.,
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. Fourth, a computer does comparison op-
erations, i e., the computer must be able to tell if two numbers are equal, or one is greater,
and if so, which is greater. Fifth, a computer has input capability. And finally, a computer
has output capability. Without the last two functions, a computer would be virtually useless.
3. Bigelow, supra note I, at 1.
4. Id.
5. Freed, 4 Lawyer's Guide Through the Computer Maze, 6 PRc. LAW. 15, 18 (Nov.
1960) [hereinafter cited as Freed]. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the
problems that arise from the use of computers in banking. Cases that address this area
include Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976) (customer-bank communication terminals may constitute a bank
branch under some circumstances); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Georgia R.R. Bank &
Trust Co., 229 S.E.2d 482 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976), aff'dper ctriam, 235 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Sup. Ct.
1977) (check in amount of $25,000 improperly encoded magnetically as being for $2500);
Gabalac v. Firestone Bank, 346 N.E.2d 326 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (check in amount of $45
improperly encoded magnetically as being for $10,045).
6. The Battle to See Your File-Part Three, PRIVACY J., June 1978, at 6.
7. These uses and others are noted in Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258, 271-72
(N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S.
802 (1975).
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As an indication of the extent of computer use in this country, it has
been estimated that in 1978 about 350,000 small business computer sys-
tems were installed.'
Because computers are becoming an integral part of our lives, at-
torneys should understand how they work and be able to address the
legal problems created by computer use. As advisors, negotiators, and
defenders, attorneys may become involved in the following: negotia-
tion and drafting of contracts for the purchase or lease of computer
systems; taxation problems involving computers; prosecution or de-
fense of those charged with crimes involving computers; invasions of
privacy through computer use; procurement of patent, copyright, and
trade secret protection for computers, computer programs, and com-
puter goods and services; and problems of introducing computerized
business records into evidence in judicial proceedings. 9 This article is
written for the attorney with little background in the area of computers
who may be called upon for advice on a computer-related matter.
Without some familiarity with computers and the law relating to them,
an attorney may be unable to prevent, resolve, understand, or even rec-
ognize a computer-related legal problem.
I. COMPUTER CONTRACTING
When a client is contemplating the purchase or lease of a com-
puter system, his attorney may either draft the contract or review a
contract drafted by another. At present, however, contracting expertise
in the data processing field is inadequate. 10 The major problem in ne-
8. McCartney, Small Business Systems: They're Everywhere, 24 DATAMATION 91 (Oct.
1978). Pharmacies and insurance brokerage offices are suggested as likely candidates for
small business computers. Id.
9. It is acknowledged that computer-related problems occur in other areas, such as in-
ternational computer law, banking, and data communications, and that the discussion of
selected topics could be expanded. Such expansion, however, would prevent this article
from achieving its purpose, which is to provide a non-technicaUy oriented attorney with a
brief background in computer law sufficient to enable the attorney to recognize problems
that otherwise may go unnoticed. Readers seeking a more in-depth discussion are referred
to sources cited in this article.
10. The consensus at a recent Computer Law Association convention was that
"[c]omputer contract litigation should be a booming [business] for years to come, consider-
ing the sorry state of existing [data processing] contracting procedures." Computerworld,
Nov. 6, 1978, at 9, col. 1. The Computer Law Association is a national organization, the
membership of which is composed of lawyers, data processors, and others interested in com-
puter law.
Sources that discuss the negotiation and drafting of data processing contracts include R.
BERNACCHI & G. LARSEN, DATA PROCESSING CONTRACTS AND THE LAW (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as BERNACCHi]; D. BRANDON & S. SEGELSTEIN, DATA PROCESSING CONTRACTS
(1976) [hereinafter cited as BRANDON & SEGELSTEIN]; Bigelow, Comrputer Contract Check-
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gotiating for computer services is the failure of the user to specify his
needs,1 particularly the computer output he desires. Perhaps this is
caused by the belief that the computer company is familiar with other
businesses and knows what a user's needs are. This assumption, how-
ever, may not be justified. The user should specify his needs exactly to
ensure that an unwanted product is not delivered. These specifications
should become a part of the contract.
The contract for the purchase or lease of the computer hardware
12
should set out not only the general description of the hardware, but
also the detailed specifications. 13 The greater the detail of these specifi-
cations, the less likely it is that a dispute will arise as to what is to be
delivered. For example, there is little margin for misunderstanding if
the specifications for a line printer include the number of characters per
line and the number of lines to be printed per page.
The purchaser or lessee must get information from the computer
company about site requirements,14 including electrical power, cabling,
fire protection equipment, air conditioning, and floor load limits. The
contract must specify who has the responsibility for site preparation
and when that preparation must be done.
Both the hardware and the software 15 must be delivered. There
list, in R. BIGELOW & S. NYCUM, YOUR COMPUTER AND THE LAW 213-31 app. H (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Checklist]; COMPUTER L. SERV. (R. Bigelow ed. 1972) (a multi-volume
set containing many items of interest, including sample contracts, cases, and articles in the
computer law area).
11. Computerworld, Nov. 6, 1978, at 9, col. 1.
12. "Hardware" is defined as "the physical equipment such as the mechanical, magnetic,
electrical and electronic devices from which a computer is fabricated, the material forming a
computer, as distinct from the [programs]." MEEK, supra note 2, at 103. Usually the hard-
ware is thought of as including the computer and various peripheral equipment hooked up
to the computer and used for input, output, and storage of data. The peripheral equipment
includes tape drives, disc drives, memory extensions, printers, card readers, and remote ter-
minals such as typewriters or cathode ray tubes. See BERNACCHI, supra note 10, at 217.
13. See Checklist, § 3.1.a, supra note 10, at 215.
14. BRANDON & SEGELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 102; Checklist, § 4, supra note 10, at 217-
18.
15. Here, the reader should become familiar with two definitions: "program" and
"software." A program is a "complete set of instructions directing a computer to perform a
data processing task. The term implies an extended sequence incorporating all of the de-
tailed steps and procedures required to complete a job." MEEK, supra note 2, at 176.
Software has been briefly defined as "[tlhe collection of all programs for a computer." Id. at
210. However, the word has no generally accepted meaning within the data processing in-
dustry. Software may include a listing of computer program instructions that can be read by
a human; it may include those same computer instructions translated into machine readable
form and now residing on some storage media such as magnetic tape; it may include those
same computer instructions after they have been "read into" the computer, and it may in-
clude human readable documentation which describes the capabilities of the computer pro-
1980]
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will be several types of hardware, such as the computer, the printer,
and the remote terminals. The system may be functionally useless,
however, until the software is also delivered. Because failure of timely
delivery has been a major problem in the data processing industry,'
6
contract remedies for late delivery must be given careful attention.
Once the hardware and software are delivered, there must be ac-
ceptance of the system. The contract should be written so that the user
need not accept it unless the hardware works as specified in the hard-
ware components manual, 17 the computer programs work in accord-
ance with their specifications, and the system operates in accordance
with an agreed standard of reliability.'s Even after acceptance, how-
ever, if the system does not perform properly, the purchaser or lessee
may have a cause of action for breach of specific contract terms or mis-
representation during negotiations.' 9
After the computer system is installed, emergency and periodic
maintenance of the hardware must be performed either by the manu-
gram. Software also may be used to describe data to be processed by the computer. Such
data may be customer lists, student grades, or some other set of information. As with com-
puter programs, this data may be represented in human or machine readable form, and
either form may be considered software. See D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: EVIDENCE AND
PROCEDURE § 2.06 (1978) [hereinafter cited as BENDER].
16. BERNACCHI, supra note 10, at 124.
17. BRANDON & SEGELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 94.
18. Checklist, § 6.3.c, supra note 10, at 220. For example, new equipment should run for
30 consecutive days with no more than five percent "downtime." Downtime generally is
defined as equipment failure that prevents use of the computer. BERNACCHI, supra note 10,
at 658. To have a basis for deciding whether to accept the entire delivered system, the user
should prepare test data with known results. Checklist § 6.3.c., supra note 10, at 220. The
test data could then be input to the computer, and the output could be compared with the
known results. If the computer generated incorrect results, the computer company should be
allowed a period of time within which to make corrections. After the correction period, the
test data would be run again. A breach could be declared if the output were again incorrect.
BRANDON & SEGELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 94.
19. See, e.g., Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971),
in which a user of data processing services recovered damages from a supplier for misrepre-
sentations made by the supplier during negotiations as to the efficiency and effectiveness of
the services provided. Recovery was permitted under Minnesota law even though the con-
tract disclaimed the supplier's responsibility for statements not occurring in the contract.
Unlike many states, Minnesota permits recovery for innocent misrepresentation. Id. at 176-
79. Readers are cautioned that many states have a scienter requirement. Id. at 179. See
also Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F. Supp. 504 (D. Conn. 1975), in
which the lessee of data processing equipment recovered general damages against the lessor
of the equipment on grounds of breach of warranty. Because there was a lease clause pro-
viding that the lessor would not be liable for consequential damages, and because the conse-
quential damages flowed from misrepresentations made by the lessor during negotiations
which were not included in the contract, the court held that the lessee could not recover
consequential damages on a breach of warranty cause of action. The court, however, per-
mitted these damages under the cause of action for tortious misrepresentation. Id. at 508-11.
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facturer or by an independent maintenance company. If the mainte-
nance is to be done by the manufacturer, it may be part of a
comprehensive contract. If the maintenance is to be performed by an-
other company, a separate maintenance contract is required. Mainte-
nance provisions for prompt and effective maintenance as well as
remedies for failure to provide such maintenance and for continuing
failures of the hardware are necessary.2° The contract may provide for
"fixed price" maintenance, which is in essence an insurance policy for
maintenance and probably for replacement parts as well. This is a se-
cure method, but expensive. The alternative type of maintenance con-
tract may require payment for time and materials, and is expensive if
the equipment malfunctions frequently.
Hardware maintenance contract considerations other than cost
may be important. For example, because the computer system may
become totally inoperative, it is important that the emergency mainte-
nance be done promptly. Thus, response time is a key contract factor.
It is useful to negotiate a maximum time for response and to provide
for some type of compensation2' if the response time is not met. An-
other important maintenance consideration is access to the computer
system. In negotiating this item, the user should attempt to contract for
the preventive maintenance to be performed during the firm's non-
work hours in order to prevent disruption of use of the computer.
Considerations for maintenance of the software are similar to
those for the hardware. The vendor should guarantee that the com-
puter programs will work according to specification for a set period of
time. Any corrections necessary during this period should be guaran-
teed to be made at no charge. After the guarantee period, of course,
there can be service charges22 pursuant to a separate maintenance
agreement or clause. The user should secure a contractual commitment
that software errors will be corrected within a specified time. A liqui-
dated damages provision may be drafted as a remedy if the errors are
not corrected promptly.23
Remedies are a key aspect of any contract. In the data processing
area it is important that the contract remedy fit the breach. For exam-
ple, if the computer system is delivered late, liquidated damages may
20. BRANDON & SEGELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 95.
21. One example is reduced maintenance costs. Id. at 96.
22. Note that this may occur even though the program error existed prior to the expira-
tion of the guarantee period, if the error is unfortunately not discovered until after the pe-
riod expires. Most computer programming firms, as a gesture of goodwill, do not charge to
correct latent errors discovered after the expiration of the warranty period.
23. See R. FREED, COMPUTERS AND LAW 223, cl. 9.a (1976).
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be more appropriate than termination because it may take many
months to obtain delivery of another system. Once the computer sys-
tem is installed, the user may be more interested in having the vendor
supply a back-up computer facility than receiving money damages.
24
The purchaser or lessee of data processing services may wish to
hire a consultant to assist in acquiring the services.25 While a contract
between the hirer and the consultant should be considered, circum-
stances may not justify a formal contract. For example, the hirer may
be dealing with an extremely reliable consultant who will provide only
a few hours of service for a fee. The time and expense of a detailed
contract are not required in this instance. If, however, a formal con-
tract is desired, there are some factors that should be considered. For
example, the contract should specify the consultant's tasks in order to
avoid unnecessary charges and to provide for the needed services. The
contract should specify the number of days, weeks, or months the con-
sultant's services are to be provided. The hirer should have an option
for early termination of unsatisfactory consultant services. In addition,
there should be an option to extend the services if necessary. It should
be determined whether the consultant's fees increase for work done on
weekends or holidays. The hirer may wish to specify the maximum
charge in order to avoid the possibility of the consultant's taking ad-
vantage of an open-ended consulting agreement.
In helping to implement the system, the consultant may learn con-
fidential information about the hirer's clients or about other aspects of
the hirer's business. The contract should mention the confidential na-
ture of the information and require that the consultant use such in-
formation only in fulfillment of the consulting project.
A final point regarding consultants is the evaluation of their serv-
ices. Unfortunately, there are few guidelines to determine malpractice
by a data processing consultant. The hirer must monitor the work of
the consultant and determine whether the work is proceeding in a pro-
fessional manner. Scheduled meetings with the consultant at which the
consultant gives progress reports may be useful.
II. STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION OF COMPUTER
GOODS AND SERVICES
The following discussion deals with state and local taxation
24. See BRANDON & SEGELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 93, 260 (examples of contract clauses
on the availability of backup facilities).
25. See generally BERNACCHI, supra note 10, at 455-62.
[Vol. 13
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problems26 and concentrates on three areas: the classification of com-
puter software as "tangible" or "intangible," the classification of com-
puter programs according to the exact function they perform, and the
taxation of goods and services provided by computer service bureaus.
A. Taxing Computer Software.- Is It To Be Taxed as
Tangible or Intangible?
In the area of taxation, one question that courts have recently ad-
dressed is whether software should be treated as tangible or intangible
property. This classification is often a crucial factor when determining
whether a transaction that involves software is taxable. In the cases
discussed below, the courts found the software to be intangible prop-
erty.
In District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates, Inc.,27
Universal purchased a computer (the hardware) and punched cards
(the computer programs) from IBM. Local laws subjected tangible per-
sonal property, but not intangible property, to a personal property
tax.2 s The court held that the punched cards (programs) were intangi-
ble and should not be subject to the tax on tangible personal property.
It noted that the punched cards themselves were of little value and that
the consideration had been paid for the intangible information con-
tained on the cards.29
26. Federal income tax questions involve both hardware and software and raise
problems in the area of investment credits, capitalization versus expense, and depreciation.
For a list of articles on federal taxation of computers, see 1 COMPUTER L.J. 611, 658-59
(1979). See also Bigelow, Federal Software Taxation, [1972-1979 Transfer Binder] I COM-
PUTER L. SERV. § 2-3.2 (R. Bigelow ed.); Computer Taxation at the Federal Level-Update:
1979, Presentation by Michael W. Berwind to the 1979 Computer Law Association Confer-
ence in Washington, D.C. (March 5, 1979).
27. 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
28. Id. at 617.
29. Id. The court compared computer software to the cartoon mats involved in Wash-
ington Times-Herald v. District of Columbia, 213 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1954), in which the
cartoon mats sold by publishing syndicates to individual newspapers were held not to be
tangible personal property for sales tax purposes. This was because the mats from which the
cartoons could be reproduced had inconsequential value, and the newspapers had really
bought the right to reproduce the creations of the artists who made the drawings. Id. at 24.
The court in Universal Computer found that the knowledge stored on the computer cards
was more demonstrably intangible property, in the sense of being the result of individual
intellectual efforts, than the right to reproduce the cartoonists' drawings in Washington
Times-Herald. 465 F.2d at 618.
In Universal Computer, the court faced another common computer tax problem, that of
"unbundling." The hardware and software had been "bundled" together and sold for about
$290,000; but only the hardware was subject to the personal property tax. The court unbun-
dled the sale to determine the value of the hardware. After making some mathematical
calculations, explaining the uncertainty involved, and describing the contradictory evidence
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Although Universal Computer involved personal property taxes,
the same problem of determining if software is tangible or intangible
occurs with sales and use taxes. Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell"
involved the question of whether computer software is tangible per-
sonal property for sales tax purposes. The court defined tangible per-
sonal property as that " 'which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt, or
touched, or is in any other manner perceptible to the senses,' "31 and
held that computer software is not tangible personal property and
therefore is not subject to the sales tax.32 The court found that mag-
netic tapes and punched cards are not a crucial element of software
because the information could be transmitted by telephone lines with-
out any tangible manifestation of transmission.33 Therefore, the court
reasoned, the transfer of any tangible personal property was incidental
to the purchase of the intangibles stored on tape, and the sale of com-
puter software did not constitute the sale of tangible personal property
under the applicable state statute.34 In State v. Central Computer Serv-
ices, Inc.,35 the Alabama Supreme Court had to decide whether com-
puter software constitutes tangible personal property for purposes of
the state use tax. The reasoning of the majority paralleled that of the
courts in Universal Computer and Commerce Union Bank, and it con-
cluded that computer software is intangible property.36
regarding the value of hardware and software, the court found that a fifty-fifty split was
reasonable, saying that "[w]ith a different set of facts, King Solomon did no better in making
a similar choice." Id. at 619-20 (citing I Kings 3:16-28).
30. 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1976).
31. Id. at 406 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3002(1) (1976)).
32. The court said:
What is created and sold here is information, and the magnetic tapes which contain
this information are only a method of transmitting these intellectual creations from
the originator to the user. It is merely incidental that these intangibles are trans-
mitted by way of a tangible reel of tape that is not even retained by the user.
538 S.W.2d at 407.
33. Id. at 407-08.
34. Id. at 408. In 1977, Tennessee enacted legislation to impose sales tax on certain
types of computer programs. This was repealed in 1978, leaving Commerce Union Bank as
the law in Tennessee in the area of sales tax on computer programs. COMPUTER L. & TAX
REP., May 1978, at 7; COMPUTER L. & TAX REP., Mar. 1978, at 7; COMPUTER L. & TAX
REP., Feb. 1978, at 5-6.
35. 349 So. 2d 1160 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1977).
36. The court compared computer software to movies and discussed Boswell v. Para-
mount Telev. Sales, Inc., 282 So. 2d 892 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1973), in which it was held that the
leasing of movie films and tapes by Paramount to television stations in Alabama involved
the leasing of tangible personal property rather than an intangible right to publish. 349 So.
2d at 1162. However, the court in Central Computer distinguished the use of computer
software from the use of movies by noting that the physical presence of the movie film is
essential to broadcasting the movie, while the physical presence of magnetic tape or punched
1980] COMPUTER LAW
B. Taxing Computer Software: Is It To Be Taxed
Based on Its Function?
California has enacted legislation specifically dealing with per-
sonal property taxation of computer programs. 37 Thus, in California it
is not necessary to determine whether the programs are tangible or in-
tangible. Essentially, California's personal property tax is levied on the
basic operational programs, 38 and there is no tax on the other pro-
grams.39 Thus, California's approach for personal property tax deter-
minations is to categorize, not according to what is "tangible" or
"intangible," but rather according to the function of the programs.
40
C. Sales Tax on Goods and Services Provided by Service Bureaus
A final area of interest involves the taxation of goods and services
provided by service bureaus.41 Accountants Computer Services, Inc. v.
Kosydar,42 an Ohio case, provides a good discussion of the issues in-
cards is not essential to the transmittal of the computer programs. As an example, the court
said that the programs can be transmitted to the computer by telephone. Id.
The dissent responded to this argument by stating that films can also be transmitted by
telephone lines or radio waves, or the actors could make a personal appearance. The film
still has value, however, because of what it contains and therefore is considered tangible.
Similarly, the computer cards and tapes have value because of their contents. Also, in Bos-
well, hardware was used to get information from the film, just as hardware is used to get
information from the computer cards or tapes. Id. at 1164-65 (Maddox, J., dissenting). The
dissent's point seems to be that if the computer programs were transmitted by telephone
lines, there would be no use tax because nothing tangible was transmitted. But because the
medium chosen for transmittal was tangible, the use tax applies. In essence, the dissent's
argument would exalt form over substance.
37. CAL. REv. & TAX CODE §§ 995-995.2 (West Supp. 1979).
38. The functions of basic operational programs are:
operation of a computer by managing the allocation of all system resources, includ-
ing the central processing unit, main storage, input/output devices and processing
programs. A processing program is used to develop and implement the specific
applications which the computer is to perform. Its operation is possible only
through the facilities provided by the. . . [basic operational] program; however, it
is not in itself fundamental and necessary to the functioning of a computer.
Id. § 995.2. The California code uses the phrase "processing program" similarly to the way
others use the term "application program." Application programs are designed to carry out
specific tasks for the user of the computer, such as bookkeeping, billing, and statistical anal-
ysis. See BERNACCHI, supra note 10, at 280-82.
39. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 995, 995.2 (West Supp. 1979). Other programs include:
(I) application programs (defined in note 38 supra), (2) programs allowing the user to write a
computer program in one computer language and have it translated to another, and (3)
several other programs not necessary to this discussion. Id. § 995.2.
40. Id. §§ 995, 995.2.
41. Service bureaus are businesses that provide data processing services for others. See
BERNACCHI, supra note 10, at 380.
42. 298 N.E.2d 519 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1973).
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volved by considering three separate fact situations. In all three, the
issue was whether the transfer of personal property would be exempt
from taxation because the real purpose of the transaction was the
purchase of services, and the personal property was transferred only as
an inconsequential element of the transaction. The problem exists be-
cause most transactions involve both personal services and the transfer
of some tangible personal property.
The court said that the real objective of the buyer is the critical
factor in determining whether the sales tax would apply. If what is
sought is service, the sales tax does not apply. If the objective is ob-
taining tangible personal property, however, the tax applies to the en-
tire gross receipts without deduction for work, labor, skill, thought,
time, or other expense of producing the property.
43
The court listed three possibilities regarding mixed sales of serv-
ices and property:
1. The service is the main item sold and the property sold is
incidental thereto and not separately charged (not a taxable
sale as a sale of services).
2. The services and property sold can be readily separated
(one tax exempt and the other taxable).
3. The service sold is incidental to the property and not sep-
arately charged (taxable in gross).44
The court then applied these three standards to the situations before it.
In the first situation, the service bureau (taxpayer) received raw mate-
rial from its customer and transcribed it onto key punched cards. The
cards were then fed into a data processing machine to be sorted, classi-
fied, and rearranged. The printout was delivered to the customer who
studied, altered, analyzed, and adjusted the data. Thus, the object of
the transaction was to produce the rearranged raw material, the
"writeup work." The limited personal service was an inconsequential
element of the object that was sought and purchased. Therefore, the
entire transaction was taxable, under the sales tax, with no allowance
for the insignificant personal service rendered. 45
In the second situation, the service bureau obtained information
from its client for analysis of business problems. The service bureau's
43. Id. at 526. The court did not specifically describe how to determine the true object
sought by the purchaser. In its examination of the three situations before it, the court sug-
gested that one can readily determine whether a purchaser seeks services or tangible prop-
erty by examining the facts. Id. at 527-28.
44. Id. at 526 (quoting Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 402 P.2d
423, 427 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965)).
45. Id. at 527-28.
Vol. 13
COMPUTER L4W
employees analyzed the client's present system. The data processing
machines and their printouts were used to assist the service bureau in
sorting work to allow its personnel to solve the client's problems. The
printed matter was valuable because it was the result of personal serv-
ice efforts by the service bureau personnel. Thus, the tangible property
(ie., the printed paper) was an inconsequential element for which no
separate charge was made. The contents of the paper represented per-
sonal services, that is, analysis of the client's problems, and, therefore,
no tax was imposed on this analysis.4
The third situation before the court did not involve a data process-
ing service bureau, but the facts nevertheless seem applicable to the
problem of applying a sales tax to output from a service bureau. In this
instance, a market research firm was to compile and interpret statistical
data in order to determine marketing information. It was also to ana-
lyze, interpret, and present to the customer the statistical information
and assist the customer in management and marketing decisions based
on the data. The court concluded that the intellectual and manual ef-
forts of the employees of the marketing research firm were what was
purchased, and not the inconsequential tangible personal property that
was transferred. Thus, there was no taxation of any portion of the con-
sideration paid.47
III. CRIMINAL LAW
In the area of criminal law, it is important for attorneys to under-
stand the workings of computers in order to assist a company with a
computer to anticipate the types of crimes that might be committed and
to take steps to prevent these crimes. It is also important for the prose-
cutor to understand exactly how the crime was committed so that he
can determine whether state or federal law was violated and choose the
correct forum for prosecution, decide exactly which section of the crim-
inal code encompasses the behavior sought to be prosecuted,48 and de-
46. Id. at 528.
47. Id. It should be noted that in 1978, Ohio revised its tax code so that the transfer of
the results of electronic data processing of another's data is deemed to be a service and not
taxable under the tax code. OHIO REV. CODE AN. § 5739.01(B) (Page Supp. 1978). The
analysis in the Accountants Computer Services case is useful in construing other tax codes
that do not refer specifically to electronic data processing.
48. Charging the correct crime can be a major problem. Because criminal codes rarely
are written with computer crime in mind, the prosecutor often must attempt to fit a com-
puter crime into a category when the fit might not be comfortable. For example, if software
is misappropriated using a remote terminal, the prosecution, depending on state law, may
take any of several forms, e.g., misappropriation of trade secrets, larceny, telephone abuse,
and forgery. See Nycum, The Criminal Law Aspects of Computer Abuse, RUTGERS J. OF
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cide how to investigate the alleged crime.
Experts believe that computer crime is almost impossible to detect
and that it costs the public at least $10 billion annually.4 9 Computers
are heavily used in banking, credit transactions, payroll, inventory,
trading of securities, maintenance of tax and health records, and in var-
ious other kinds of information processing. None of these areas of
computer processing appears to be safe from criminal infiltration.
Five categories of common computer crime are financial crimes,
property crimes, information crimes, theft of services, and vandalism.50
Financial crimes usually involve the taking of money or negotiable in-
struments and are executed in systems in which the computer is used
for payroll, accounts payable and receivable, and various financial
records.5 In an ingenious crime, an individual in Washington, D.C.,
opened a bank account. He received checks and deposit slips, both
bearing his name at the top and his magnetically coded computer-read-
able account number at the bottom. He took a stock of blank deposit
slips which the bank had made available for depositors who had for-
gotten their deposit slips. He then had printed his account number in
magnetic ink at the bottom of these blank deposit slips and placed them
back into the bank's tray. Unwary depositors used the slips to make
deposits. The deposit slips were fed into the bank's computer system
for sorting. Slips with no magnetic coding were sorted out of the sys-
COMPUTERS AND THE L. 271, 276-91 (1976). Fortunately, some states have legislation spe-
cifically describing computer crime. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 1980); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 815.01-.07 (West Supp. 1979).
49. L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1980, Part I, at 4, col. I. See also Bequai, Computer Crime- A
Growing and Serious Problem, 6 POLICE L.Q. 22, 23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bequai].
50. Bequai, supra note 49, at 23.
5 1. Id. In one well-publicized incident, a computer expert, Stanley M. Rifkin, followed
through with a remarkable plan. L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1979, Part I, at 16, col. 1. "Rifkin, a
computer expert, illegally used Security Pacifie's inter-bank funds wire to transfer $10.2 mil-
lion to . . . [another] bank." Santa Monica Evening Outlook, Oct. 5, 1979, at A-5, col. 3.
The following account of the crime was relayed by Kathy Stoltz, an Assistant United States
Attorney, who was chief prosecutor in the Rifkin case. She recalled that prior to the time of
the crime, Rifkin was an independent contractor doing computer work at Security Pacific
Bank in Los Angeles. His job was completed, but because of the trust relationship he had
built at the bank, he was able to get access to the wire transfer room. In the wire room he
learned an identification number. Posing as a bank officer, he then telephoned Security
Pacific Bank in Los Angeles and ordered a $10.2 million wire transfer, through a New York
bank, to the Swiss bank account of a Russian diamond company. In this way he was able to
purchase diamonds from the diamond company. Security Pacific Bank personnel made a
computer entry to effect the transfer, but Rifkin did not have any interaction with the com-
puter. Telephone Interview with Kathy Stoltz, Asst. U.S. Atty., in Los Angeles, Calif. (Oct.
15, 1979). Perhaps Rifkin's crime should be labeled a "telephone crime" rather than a
"computer crime."
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tern by machine and processed manually. Those having magnetic cod-
ing were routed for deposit into the account represented by the
magnetic code. Thus, the deposits of bank customers using these al-
tered deposit slips were directed to the criminal's account. By the time
customers began to complain that their deposits were not being
credited to their accounts, the criminal had withdrawn $100,000 from
his account and disappeared.5"
Property crimes involve the taking of merchandise or other prop-
erty, either for personal use or for sale. In an instance of such conduct,
a college engineering student who periodically rummaged through the
telephone company's trash cans looking for computer information dis-
covered a set of computer system instructions for the company's equip-
ment ordering system. Using a touch-tone telephone and the system
instructions, the student placed orders for various products with the
company's computer. From the material he had found in the trash, he
knew that the company allowed for a certain amount of loss in deliv-
eries. Thus, he was able to keep his orders within the loss allowance
and avoid detection. It is estimated that he stole more than one million
dollars of equipment by the time he was caught.53
Information crimes encompass those in which a criminal gains ac-
cess to a computer and gets valuable information from it, often for sale
to others. For example, three computer operators for Encyclopaedia
Britannica allegedly extracted from a computer a customer list valued
at one million dollars and then sold it. 4 In another scheme involving
theft of information, a computer operator for the Illinois Driver Regis-
tration Bureau was bribed to steal a computer tape reel containing driv-
ers' names and addresses. These had a direct mail value of $70,000.
The stolen list was put to commercial use by outsiders." A variation of
the information crime involves the addition of unauthorized informa-
tion to a computer list. In one such instance, employees of the New
York Department of Motor Vehicles were charged with accepting
bribes to add names to the computer's list of approved applicants for
52. Whiteside, Annals of Crime: Dead Souls in the Computer, NEw YORKER, Aug. 22,
1977, at 35 & 50 [hereinafter cited as Whiteside].
53. Bequai, supra note 49, at 23; Whiteside, supra note 52, at 55-56. Perhaps this was a
situation when crime did pay because after some plea bargaining, the student was sentenced
to 60 days at a prison farm. With time off for good behavior, he served only 40 days. Fur-
thermore, he settled a $250,000 civil suit brought against him by the telephone company for
$8,500. He then went into business serving as a consultant to various businesses in computer
crime prevention. Whiteside, supra note 52, at 56.
54. Bequai, supra note 49, at 23-24; Whiteside, supra note 52, at 60.
55. Whiteside, supra note 52, at 60.
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drivers' licenses. The names belonged mostly to non-English speaking
inmmigrants who had never taken the required eye, written, and driving
examinations. 6
Theft of services involves unauthorized use of the computer. For
example, one bookmaker gained access to a university computer to
make his betting calculations.5 1 In another instance, an employee was
discovered to have used a company computer for his own business.58
Inasmuch as the computer may be sitting unused, it may be thought
that there is no monetary loss to the company from unauthorized ac-
cess. However, the loss in the rental value of computer time must be
considered. In one instance, a computer service organization rented
out computer time. One of its former employees gained access by tele-
phone to the service organization's computers in order to benefit his
current employer. One hundred forty-three hours of computer time,
with a rental value of $15,000, were used in this scheme.5 9
Vandalism is a serious crime involving intentional damage to the
computer or equipment.60 For example, a computer-tape librarian,
fired because her love affairs with two data processors caused turmoil
at the company, erased or mislabeled enough computer tapes before
she left to cost the company $10 million to recreate the destroyed
data.61 Computers have also been the targets of physical attacks, ap-
parently because people view them as an electronic destroyer of per-
sonal identity, or as otherwise representing an unwanted system.62 For
example, it is suspected that groups opposed to the Vietnam War were
responsible for bombing computer centers at universities reported to be
engaged in Defense Department research.63
In addition to the categorization of the types of computer crime, it
is worthwhile to outline the five phases of computer operation during
which a criminal can intervene in the process. The five common phases
of operation are: (1) input, (2) programming, (3) processing in the cen-
tral processing unit, (4) output, and (5) communication of data.' Dur-
ing the input phase, the criminal might place false data into the
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Bequai, supra note 49, at 24.
59. Whiteside, supra note 52, at 60.
60. Bequai, supra note 49, at 24.
61. Whiteside, supra note 52, at 63.
62. Id. at 36.
63. In particular, one should note the events that occurred in 1970 at the University of
Wisconsin and at Fresno State College in California. Id.
64. Bequai, supra note 49, at 24-26.
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computer. In one instance, an officer of a manufacturing firm inserted
into the computer false data creating phony suppliers and truckers.
About one million dollars in checks were issued to these accounts and
pocketed by the officer and several cohorts.65 Also, computer program-
mers have been known to alter payroll input data in order to give cer-
tain employees unauthorized pay raises.66 As another example, a
computer specialist employed by the Australian Taxation Commission
was reported to have sold highly confidential information about how
the Commission's computerized system checked on the legitimacy of
taxpayers' claims for deductions. Using the information, taxpayers
were able to exaggerate claims for tax deductions.67
In the programming stage, the criminal can program the computer
to operate in a manner consistent with his scheme. For example, two
programmers employed at a large New York company programmed
the company's computer to increase by two cents the amount withheld
from other employees' paychecks for federal taxes. They also program-
med the computer to add two cents per employee to their own federal
withholding accounts. At the end of the year, they received the money
in the form of refund checks from the Internal Revenue Service.68 In
another programming scheme, a computer programmer for a mail-or-
der sales company instructed the computer to subtract a few cents from
commissions that were to be added to the company's sales-commission
accounts and add the money to a dummy sales commission account he
had established for himself under the name Zwana. He knew that the
company's computer processed accounts in alphabetical order and he
programmed the computer to transfer the excess pennies to the last ac-
count. By accident he was caught when the first and last sales-commis-
sion accounts were selected as a public relations promotion for
ceremonial treatment.69
Serving as the computer's memory bank, the central processing
unit is vulnerable to attack by criminals. An incident of infiltration of a
central processing unit involved two competing computer-service com-
panies. An employee of one of the companies decided to raid the mem-
ory of the competitor's computer in order to obtain a listing of a
computer program that had been developed by the second company.
The employee used a terminal connected to a telephone and some code
65. Id. at 25.
66. Whiteside, supra note 52, at 60-61.
67. Id. at 60.
68. Id. at 54.
69. Id.
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words, which he learned when he visited a firm that was a customer of
the competing computer company. He was able to infiltrate the com-
petitor's computer and have it print out, on his employer's computer, a
listing of the instructions for the desired computer program.70
Another method of obtaining listings of computer programs is to
take already printed programs. In Hancock v. Texas,71 a defendant's
felony conviction for the theft of fifty-nine computer programs from his
employer was affirmed. In defense to the charges, he contended that
the computer programs were not corporeal property and not the possi-
ble subject of theft. The court rejected this argument, quite possibly
because of evidence that the programs had a market value of approxi-
mately two and a half million dollars.72
During the output phase, data are transmitted to the user. These
data may be provided by the criminal to unauthorized sources. Mail-
ing lists, customer lists, and confidential marketing data are generated
at this output stage and may be illegally sold to competitors. For exam-
ple, a computer service company in California had access to computer
tapes containing lists of registered voters. In a civil suit brought by the
state, the service bureau was accused of using the tapes for commercial
purposes. The suit was settled out of court.73 In another scheme, a
computer operator instructed the computer to print out extra payroll
checks. The checks were made payable to various employees but were
taken by the computer operator. He forged the employees' signatures
and cashed the checks by endorsing them. To avoid detection, the
computer operator spread out the duplicate checks among many em-
ployees, hoping that this would minimize the risk that the employees
might notice the increase in earnings in their year-end statements of
earnings.74
Criminal intrusion during communication of data over telephone
lines can make the outsider privy to the information transmitted. In
one instance, a major oil company was bidding on drilling rights in
Alaska. The oil company used a terminal in Alaska to send informa-
70. Id. at 58-59. In another example, an electronics enthusiast, who found a computer
password, used it to infiltrate a computer in order to play computer games. Id. at 60.
71. 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1966).
72. Id. at 909-11. In the subsequent petition for federal habeas corpus relief, the defend-
ant contended that he had been unlawfully convicted of felony theft because the corporeal
personal property that he was accused of stealing did not have a value in excess of $50, but
was instead only $35 worth of paper. The federal court of appeals held that the law as
authoritatively construed by the Texas court was not so unreasonable or arbitrary as to be
violative of federal due process. Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552, 553 (5th Cir. 1967).
73. Whiteside, supra note 52, at 61.
74. Bequai, supra note 49, at 26.
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tion by telephone lines to a computer thousands of miles away. Finan-
cial analysis based on the information was transmitted back to the
terminal in Alaska. It was discovered that a competitor had tapped
into the oil company's communication lines and used the information
to underbid the oil company for the drilling rights.
75
Very few computer crime cases are reported in court opinions.
76
One reported case, United States v. Jones,7 7 addressed the issue of
whether alteration of accounts payable documents fed into a computer,
resulting in the issuance of checks payable to an improper payee, con-
stituted forgery. If it had been forgery, the indictment should have
been dismissed because forgery was specifically excluded from cover-
age in the code sections on which the indictment was based.78 The case
involved the issuance of five checks to "A.L.E. Jones" that should have
been issued to Whirlpool Corporation. The defendant had altered the
accounts payable material, which was input to the computer, so that the
checks were made payable to "A.L.E. Jones." The defendant was
charged with transporting in interstate or foreign commerce securities
valued at more than $5,000, knowing the securities to have been stolen,
converted, or taken by fraud, and selling or receiving these same securi-
ties knowing them to have been stolen, converted, or taken by fraud.
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the
securities involved were forgeries, and that forgery had specifically
been excluded from coverage in the sections upon which the indictment
was based. The court agreed that the sole issue was whether the de-
fendant's alleged activity constituted forgery. The court said that under
the common law a forgery is a writing "which falsely purports to be the
writing of a person other than the actual maker. ' 79 In other words,
forgery relates to genuineness of execution and not falsity of content.80
The district court was of the opinion that the defendant made a
false writing because, in a practical sense, the defendant drafted the
instruments, even though he employed the computer as an instrumen-
tality to write the checks.81 The appellate court disagreed, saying that
the defendant's acts did not constitute the making of a false writing, but
75. Whiteside, supra note 52, at 57-58.
76. See [1972-1979 Transfer Binder] 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. §§ 5-6 (R. Bigelow ed.).
Most of the computer crime cases, such as those discussed in Bequai, supra note 49, and
Whiteside, supra note 52, are reported only in the newspaper.
77. 553 F.2d 351 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977).
78. Id. at 352, 356.
79. Id. at 354 (citing Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512, 514 (4th Cir. 1948)).
80. Id. at 355.
81. Id. A false writing is an essential element of the crime of forgery. Id. at 354-55.
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rather amounted to the creation of a writing that was genuine in execu-
tion but false as to the statements in it. 2 The court explained that the
accounting department was defrauded into issuing a check to Jones.
Thus the check was a genuine instrument that contained a false state-
ment as to the true creditor. Because the purported maker of the check
did in fact issue the check, there was no forgery,83 and because the
checks did not fall within the statutory exclusion as forgeries, the order
of the district court dismissing the indictment was reversed. Thus,
Jones demonstrates that a prosecutor must understand the exact
method by which the computer was used to perpetrate a crime so that
he charges the correct crime.
IV. PRIVACY
Computers are used in a variety of ways to collect and disseminate
information regarding the personal, economic, and social status of indi-
viduals within our society.84 The flow of information from computers
poses a serious threat to the ability of individuals to maintain a signifi-
cant degree of privacy in their lives.8 5 There exist, however, three pos-
sible sources of protection for the right of privacy that may serve to
limit the nature and extent of computer assisted invasions of privacy.
While these protections overlap to a certain degree, they possess varied
effectiveness in preventing the abuse of computer capabilities.
A. The Constitutional Right of Privacy
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a right of
privacy is embodied in the Constitution. 6 In Roe v. Wade, the Court
noted that though the Constitution does not explicitly mention any pri-
82. Id. at 355.
83. Id. at 355-56.
84. Records are kept, for example, on medical services, health insurance, credit, family
assistance, and education. See Bouvard & Bouvard, ComputerizedInformation and Effective
Protection of Individual Rights, 12 SOCIETY 62, 64 (Sept.-Oct. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Bouvard & Bouvard].
85. Information in one computer can be cross-indexed with information contained in
another computer, thus aggregating information about an individual. Because the informa-
tion contained in the computers may be incomplete, the profile produced may be inaccurate.
Id. at 63. The threat of this aggregation is made imminent through the use of "universal
identifiers," such as social security numbers. See general , Bigelow, Computer Privacy-A
1975 Status Report, [1972-1979 Transfer Binder] 4 COMPUTER L. SERV. § 5-2, at 8-11 (R.
Bigelow ed.). Computers can be used to invade privacy in a variety of ways; for example,
computers can be used to make unwanted telephone solicitation. See PRIVACY J., Mar.
1978, at 2; PRIVACY J., Feb. 1978, at 7.
86. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
[Vol. 13
COMPUTER LAW
vacy right, "the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution." 7 This right of privacy is encompassed within the four-
teenth amendment's guarantee of personal liberty."' By holding that
the right of privacy is a fundamental right, the Court mandated that
regulations interfering with these rights can be justified only if there is
a compelling state interest.8 9
The Court further described the nature of the right of privacy in
Whalen v. Roe." The Court reasoned that there were two attributes to
the right of privacy: (1) the right against disclosure of personal matters
and (2) the right of an individual to make fundamental personal deci-
sions free from governmental interference. 91 Invasions of privacy re-
sulting from computer use relate primarily to the right against
disclosure of personal matters.92
In Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court decided that
the constitutional right to privacy did not prevent a state from using a
computer to compile information on individuals obtaining medical pre-
scriptions for certain drugs.93 The State of New York justified the chal-
lenged statute on the basis that the state would otherwise be unable to
prevent stolen prescriptions from being used, pharamacists from re-
peatedly refilling prescriptions, users from obtaining prescriptions from
more than one doctor, and doctors from over-prescribing. 94 In part, the
Act required the recording of patient information in a centralized com-
puter file to assist in investigation of abuses.95 Patients argued that the
possibility that the information might become public, and thus ad-
versely affect their reputations, made them reluctant to use the drugs.96
The Court found that the implementation procedures for the stat-
ute showed a proper concern for the individual's privacy.97 In fact, the
statute expressly prohibited public disclosure of the recorded informa-
87. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
88. Id. at 153. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977). The fourteenth amend-
ment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
89. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
90. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
91. Id. at 598-600.
92. See generally Bouvard & Bouvard, supra note 84.
93. 429 U.S. at 591.
94. Id. at 592.
95. Id. at 591-92, 597-98.
96. Id. at 600.
97. Id. at 593-94, 597-98, 600. The information was kept in a vault in a room which was
surrounded by a locked wire fence and protected by an alarm system. Id. at 593-94.
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tion.98 The Court recognized the threat of privacy invasion created as a
result of the computer's ability to store, retrieve, and disseminate vast
amounts of information.99 The Court found, however, that the opera-
tion of the statute did not violate the plaintiffs' right to privacy,1°° al-
though the Court did indicate that there may exist situations in which
the government's activities could violate the constitutionally protected
right of privacy.'
The Court in Whalen was not presented with legislation that in-
vaded privacy. Therefore, it is difficult to determine those factors es-
sential to a finding of a computer aided invasion of privacy. From the
Court's description of the nature of the right of privacy, it is clear that
some sort of public disclosure, or a realistic threat of such disclosure, is
necessary. ' 0 2 This disclosure requirement may significantly narrow the
class of constitutionally actionable privacy invasions. Furthermore,
such constitutional protection only exists against the government.
10 3
Legal protection against non-governmental computer privacy invasions
must have its source outside the United States Constitution.' °4
B. Common Law Protection of Privacy
Common law protections for the right of privacy have not been
very effective at limiting computer assisted invasions of privacy. The
ineffectiveness of common law protections is due largely to the histori-
cal developments of such protections in a pre-technological era. While
a specific "right of privacy" did not exist at common law, various civil
actions protected particular personal and property rights which roughly
98. Id. at 605.
99. Id. at 606.
100. The Court held that the record supported a conclusion that some use of the medica-
tion had been discouraged by individuals' concerns for their privacy, but that thousands of
prescriptions for the drugs had been filled each month, thus showing that the statute did not
deprive patients of access to the drugs. Id. at 602-03.
101. Id. at 605-06. The Court noted certain areas in which the government collects and
uses personal information for public purposes, and that generally in those areas there is a
statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. The areas mentioned by the
Court were tax collection, welfare and social security, public health, armed forces, and crim-
inal law matters. Id. at 605.
102. See id. at 600. It may be argued, however, that the mere collection of personal infor-
mation by a governmental agency having no legitimate need for the information violates
constitutionally protected privacy. See id. at 597-98.
103. See U.S. CONsT. amends. V & XIV.
104. For example, California has, by its constitution, elevated privacy to an inalienable
right. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1. This constitutional protection exists against acts by individu-
als, as well as by the government, and is aimed at curbing improper use of information that
was properly obtained for a specific purpose. Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal.
App. 3d 825, 829-30, 832, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842-43 (1976).
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correspond to modem privacy rights." 5 In an historic article, Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis cogently argued for the consolidation of
these discrete common law rights into a judicially cognizable right of
privacy.' 6 While Warren and Brandeis were clearly concerned about
the effect that technological advances would have on the right of pri-
vacy, 10 7 their concept of privacy was defined in terms of the tradition-
ally protected interests.'
The interests invaded by the relatively unsophisticated means of
the pre-technological era were usually associated with a person's like-
ness or reputation. Information per se was not protected except as a
copyright interest. The criteria that were developed to protect the com-
mon law notion of privacy, therefore, were not appropriate for prevent-
ing the more subtle invasions of privacy made possible by the
development of computer technology. 10 9 The growing recognition of
the common law right of privacy, however, preserves the possibility
that the common law may one day serve as an effective source of pro-
tection from computer assisted invasions of privacy.' 10
One modem computer capability that threatens individual privacy
is the use of customer and client lists by businesses. These lists are kept
by magazines, credit card companies, and department stores. Special-
ized lists arranged by geographic area, age, income, or other variable
can be generated quickly by computer and distributed to advertisers for
use in direct mail advertising."' Such practices do not fall neatly
within the ambit of common law protections of the right of privacy.
105. Actions such as libel and slander protected an individual's "personality" to a limited
extent, while actions for trespass, copyright, and assault protected person and property from
direct invasion. However, there were some instances of protection afforded by the common
law that were not limited by the traditional actions. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right-to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
106. Id. at 213. This article is generally regarded as the genesis of the right of privacy in
America.
107. Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which
must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual
. . . the "right to be let alone." Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enter-
prise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that "what is whispered
in the closet shall be proclaimed from the rooftops."
Id. at 195 (quoting T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
108. Id. at 200-04.
109. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960). Dean Prosser indicates that no
cause of action for public disclosure of private facts arises when a company supplies an
individual's credit history to a potential employer or other small group. Id. at 393.
110. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950).
111. See, e.g., PRIVACY J., Feb. 1978, at 1; PRIVACY J., Nov. 1978, at 2; PRIVACY J., Oct.
1979, at 4.
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In Shibley v. Time, Inc.," 2 the plaintiffs brought an action against
the publishers of Time, Esquire, Playboy, Ladies Home Journal, and
the issuer of American Express credit cards. The plaintiffs argued that
the sale of subscription lists constituted an invasion of privacy because
the buyers of these lists may draw conclusions about the financial posi-
tion, social habits, and general personality of the subscribers by virtue
of their subscribing to certain publications. This information may then
be used to determine the most effective types of advertising to be sent.
The plaintiffs argued that this privacy invasion was not consented to at
the time of the original subscription contract and that the defendants
were unjustly enriched at the subscribers' expense."13 The court, how-
ever, did not agree that any recognized right of privacy had been in-
vaded:
An actionable invasion of the right of privacy is the unwar-
ranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, by
the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public
has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's
private activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause
mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordi-
nary sensibilities." 14
The court said that the plaintiffs recognized that their situation did
not fall within the above situation but tried to bring defendants' behav-
ior into the ambit of "appropriation of one's personality."' I" This ar-
gument was rejected because appropriation of one's personality refers
to situations in which the plaintiffs name or likeness is displayed to the
public to indicate that the plaintiff endorses the defendant's business or
product. 1 6 The relative ineffectiveness of both the constitutional and
common law protections against computer invasions of privacy has
therefore created a need for legislative action to ensure that the individ-
ual right of privacy does not become an anachronism in tlie age of
computer technology.
C. Right of Privacy by Statute
Common law mechanisms safeguarding an individual's right of
privacy have failed to serve as an effective means for limiting computer
112. 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1975).
113. Id. at 338.
114. Id.
115. d. at 339.
116. Id. (construing Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1956)).
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intrusions into private affairs. Legislatures have provided statutory
protection, however, against computer aided privacy invasions.
Computers perform a critical function for the credit industry, pro-
viding potential creditors with financial and other pertinent informa-
tion for the purpose of assessing credit risk. Given the role of
computers in the credit industry and the concommitant potential for
privacy invasions, 1 7 computer use must be regulated. There are three
areas of regulation: (1) the subject matter permissible for regulation,
(2) the means permissible for the accumulation of data, and (3) the
appropriate dissemination of the accumulated data.
The California legislature has enacted the California Consumer
Credit Reporting Agencies Act." 8 The legislative findings set forth in
this statute" 19 evince a substantial concern for the privacy of individu-
als. The legislature found that elaborate mechanisms had been devel-
oped to investigate and evaluate credit worthiness and reputations of
consumers. They also discerned that credit reporting agencies play a
vital role in compiling and evaluating credit and other information
about consumers. Accordingly, the legislature determined that there
was a need to insure that the credit reporting agencies are fair and im-
partial and respect consumers' privacy rights. 2 The legislature
adopted this statute in order to guarantee the confidentiality, accuracy,
relevancy, and proper use of the information collected.
12
In order to achieve these goals, the legislature provided for the
following: (1) mandatory disclosure to the consumer of the names of
the recipients of the information; 22 (2) limitations on the subject mat-
ter of a credit report;2 3 (3) prerequisites as to when a credit report may
be furnished; 24 and (4) resolution of disputes concerning the content of
the report. 25 To enforce compliance with the procedural requirements
117. Privacy invasions by computers have a real potential for causing trouble. For exam-
ple, credit investigation companies may employ inexperienced investigators who may com-
pile misinformation that will end up in a computer data bank. See, e.g., Santa Monica
Evening Outlook, Oct. 31, 1977, Business Section, at 20, col. 2.
118. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.1-1786.56 (West 1980). See also The Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a-1681s (1976 & 1978 Supp.).
119. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.1 (West 1980).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. § 1785.10(b).
123. Id. § 1785.13(a). For example, information about bankruptcies more than fourteen
years old, unpaid judgments more than ten years old, and arrests more than seven years old
cannot be disseminated.
124. Id. § 1785.11.
125. Id. § 1785.16. Any disputed information must be investigated, and any misinforma-
tion corrected.
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of the statute, the legislature announced sanctions for violations, in-
cluding the payment of actual damages, court costs, attorneys fees,
damages for pain and suffering, punitive damages for willful violations,
and injunctive relief when appropriate.
126
Congress enacted the Federal Privacy Act of 1974127 to protect the
privacy of individuals identified in information systems maintained by
federal agencies. In addition, federal agencies are bound by the pri-
vacy protections of the Constitution. Requiring safeguards to prevent
invasions of privacy,'28 the Privacy Act mandates that federal agencies
obtain the consent of an individual prior to the disclosure of the record
to another, unless the disclosure falls within an authorized purpose.'29
Furthermore, the Privacy Act provides that an agency may only record
information that is relevant and necessary. 130 It also provides that indi-
viduals may see records relating to themselves and request that any
errors be corrected.' 3 ' The seriousness of the congressional intent to
protect the privacy of individuals is indicated by the civil and crimi-
nal 132 penalties provided for violations of the Privacy Act.
V. PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
A1. Patents
One potential method of safeguarding computer programs is
through application of patent law. United States Supreme Court deci-
sions, 133 however, indicate that it will be extremely difficult to obtain
patent protection for computer programs.13 4 Patents are designed to
give proprietors a "short-term, powerful monopoly in devices,
processes, compositions of matter and designs which embody their
ideas."' 135 Patent holders have the right to "license and control the use
of their patented devices or processes, [and] also to prevent the use of
126. Id. § 1785.31.
127. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976 & 1978 Supp.).
128. Id. § 552a(b).
129. Id. (e.g., for census purposes or for civil or criminal enforcement activity).
130. Id. § 552a(e).
131. Id. § 552a(d).
132. Id. § 552a(g), (i).
133. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); Gott-
schalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
134. For a more complete discussion of patent protection for computer programs, see
Note, Parker v. Flook and Computer Program Patents, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1627 (1979); Note,
Patent Law-Patentable Subject Matter-Computer Software-Parker v. Flook, 24 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. Rnv. 975 (1979).
135. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 41 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CONTU].
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such devices or processes when they are independently developed by
third parties." 13 6 The rights last for seventeen years.137 To qualify, a
"work must be useful, novel and non-obvious to those familiar with the
state of the art in which the patent is sought."'1
38
The United States Supreme Court has considered three cases
139
involving patents and computer programs. In all three decisions, the
Court refused to afford patent protection. None of the cases, however,
involved an attempt to patent solely the computer program. Rather,
the applicants sought to patent various procedures employing computer
programs. In these opinions, the Court has been careful to note that it
has not addressed the question of whether computer programs consti-
tute patentable subject matter, although the cases make it appear that
patent protection for computer programs is difficult to obtain.
Gottschalk v. Benson 4 ° addressed the question of whether a patent
could be granted on a method of converting numbers from one number
system to another. The applicant for the patent had a method for con-
verting from binary-coded decimal numbers to binary. The Court de-
nied the patent, reasoning that the practical effect of granting it for the
conversion method would be to patent an idea, and neither a scientific
truth nor an idea may be patented.' 4' The Court, however, noted that
it was not denying the possibility that a patent might be granted for a
computer program. 42
In Dann v. Johnston,43 the United States Supreme Court decided
whether it was proper to patent a computer system permitting "a bank
to furnish a customer with subtotals of various categories of transac-
tions completed in connection with the customer's single account, thus
136. Id.
137. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
138. CONTU, supra note 135, at 41 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 & 103 (1976)).
139. See cases cited in note 133 supra. The Supreme Court has recently granted certio-
rari in two other patent cases involving computer programs. In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807
(C.C.P.A. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Diamond v. Bradley, 48 U.S.L.W. 3595 (Mar. 18,
1980); In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979), cert. grantedsub nom. Diamond v. Diehr,
48 U.S.L.W. 3595 (Mar. 18, 1980).
140. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
141. Id. at 67. The Court found that the patent would have been one for a formula that
was one of the "basic tools of scientific and technological work." Id.
A further problem with the patent application was that the conversion method for
which protection was sought was not itself limited to its use in computers. Id. at 64. Thus,
had the patent been granted, use of the conversion process anywhere, presumably even on a
chalk board, would have infringed the patent. Id. at 71-72.
142. The Court stated, "It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program
servicing a computer. We do not so hold." Id. at 71.
143. 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
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saving the customer the time and/or expense of conducting this book-
keeping himself.""'4 The system was being sold as a computer service
to banks and other data processing companies so that they could per-
form various services for customers. The parties and several amici
asked the Court to address the general patentability of computer pro-
grams. The Court, however, elected not to reach that issue, dismissing
the patenability argument on grounds of obviousness. 45 In rejecting
the application, the Court relied on two factors. First, the system in
question was similar to services already being performed by banks in
their use of data processing equipment and computer programs, such as
giving customers multiple accounts with separate periodic statements
for each, as well as segregating service charge debits from other trans-
actions within any given account. 46 Second, the Court said that the
system was analogous to the previously patented Dirks system, which
encompasses a data processing system used to keep track of various
types of expenses for each department in a large business.147
In Parker v. Fook, 41 the applicant sought a patent on a method of
updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion processes. The only
distinction between prior methods and the Flook method was the inclu-
sion in the latter of a mathematical formula used primarily for "com-
puterized calculations producing automatic adjustments in alarm
settings."' 149 The Court stated that a scientific principle, such as that
144. Id. at 220. For example, expenditures for food, fuel, and rent might be separately
listed. The bank customer labels each check with a category code. When processing the
checks, the bank enters the code on each check in magnetic ink characters. This allows the
computer to list separately each type of expenditure on the periodic statement. Id. at 221-22.
145. Id. The Court cited 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976), which provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
146. 425 U.S. at 227. Although the Court did acknowledge that the system involved
something more than providing a summary sheet for customers with many accounts, it nev-
ertheless found that the "obviousness" test, requiring that the difference between the prior
art and the subject matter in question be "sufficient to render the claimed subject matter
unobvious to one skilled in the applicable art," was not met. Id. at 228 (citing the lower
court's dissenting opinion, 502 F.2d 765, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (Markey, C.J., dissenting)).
147. Id. Again, despite the fact that the Johnston system was not identical to the Dirks
system, it was similar enough that it was "obvious" to one who was reasonably skilled in the
"art" of data processing systems' uses in the banking industry and hence presumably aware
of the Dirks system. Id. at 229.
148. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
149. Id. at 586. During catalytic conversion processes, conditions such as temperature
and pressure are monitored. When any of these variables exceeds a predetermined alarm
limit, an alarm signals an abnormality, indicating inefficiency or danger. It is often neces-
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expressed in the mathematical formula in question, must be treated as
though it were well known, and therefore, the overall process itself, not
merely the formula, must be new and useful.' 50 Here, inasmuch as this
already known formula was the only novel feature of the Flook
method, the process simply contained no patentable invention.'51
All three of the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions in which
patents were sought on computer related subject matter resulted in de-
nial of patent protection. Similarly, in all three decisions, the Court did
not foreclose the availability of patent protection for appropriate com-
puter systems or computer programs. To be worthy of such protection
the computer program must be novel, non-obvious, and do more than
merely solve a mathematical equation. The Court in Flook asked Con-
gress for guidelines specifying patent eligibility and duration for com-
puter programs.' 52 When considering the scope of patent protection for
computer programs, there are some inherent difficulties that must be
overcome. If a person were to patent instructions comprising a com-
puter program, the protection would be illusory if another individual
could employ the fundamentals of the program and, merely by chang-
ing some instructions, not infringe the patent.' 53 Alternatively, at-
tempting to obtain a patent on the function to be performed by the
computer program, e.g., a computer program to compute baseball bat-
ting averages, could be difficult because the function to be performed
was obvious to one skilled in computers, 54 or because the program
merely solved a mathematical equation, 55 or because it was a non-
sary to update alarm limits. The patent application described a method of updating alarm
limits, consisting of three steps: (1) measuring the present value of the variable (e.g., tem-
perature); (2) using a mathematical formula to calculate an updated alarm limit; and (3)
actually adjusting the alarm limit to the new value. The only difference between conven-
tional methods and that described in the patent application was the second step-the mathe-
matical formula. Id. at 585-86.
150. Id. at 591-92.
151. Id. at 594. By way of clarification, the Court analogized the claimed method in
Flook to a claim that the formula for calculating a circle's circumference can be usefully
applied to determine the circumference of a wheel. Id. at 595.
152. It stated that the determination of what types of computer programs should be eligi-
ble for patent protection, as well as the form and duration of such protection, can best be
answered by Congress based on empirical data not available to the Court. Id. at 595.
153. Omission of one element or ingredient of a combination covered by any claim
of a patent averts any charge of infringement based on that claim. This is true
whether or not the omitted ingredient was essential to the combination of the pat-
ent and whether or not it was necessary to the operativeness of the device.
7 DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 543, at 324-25 (2d ed. 1972).
154. See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976).
155. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 591 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 71-72 (1972).
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patentable idea.'56 Thus, safeguarding computer programs through ap-
plication of patent law is inadequate because its protection is often illu-
sory or insurmountably difficult to obtain. These obstacles encourage a
discussion of other, possibly more appropriate, forms of protection.
B. Trade Secrets
The doctrine of trade secrets15 7 is recognized in all fifty states. Ex-
isting as a creature of state statute or common law, the trade secret
doctrine differs in definition and application from state to state. The
main premise is that, if a business maintains confidentiality regarding
its information or the way it accomplishes some task, the business
should be legally protected against misappropriation of the secret.' 58
Many computer businesses rely upon trade secret protection for com-
puter software,159 although there are several problems in its applica-
tion. First, lack of uniform laws reduces the utility of trade secret
protection. Second, because the maintenance of secrecy is critical to
receiving trade secret protection it may be an inappropriate method for
safeguarding information intended to be distributed widely, such as the
many computer programs that are sold in multiple copies over the
counter. A seller of software must enter into non-disclosure agree-
ments with buyers of the software, as well as with the seller's own em-
ployees and access to the secret must be limited to a small number of
people. This reduction in the flow of information wastes human effort
and causes people to write programs when similar programs have al-
ready been written, but are being kept secret. Despite the disadvan-
tages attendant upon the use of trade secret protection, it is a frequently
employed method because it affords an alternative to the narrow scope
of protection provided by patent law. Furthermore, as will be dis-
cussed later, the availability of federal copyright protection is un-
clear. 16
0
156. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
157. A trade secret is "[a]ny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it." University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown
Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b
(1939)). For a more complete discussion of trade secret protection, see Bender, Trade Secret
Protection of Software, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 909 (1970).
158. CONTU, supra note 135, at 42-43.
159. Bigelow, The Legal Protection of Proprietary Software-A Special Report, 3 COM-
PUTER L. & TAX REP. 4, 5 (Nov. 1976). See, e.g., University Computing Co. v. Lykes-
Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff awarded damages for misappro-
priation of its computerized retail inventory system).
160. The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works rec-
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C. Copyright
Because the availability of patent protection for computer pro-
grams is doubtful and maintaining trade secret protection requires
great vigilance in protecting and limiting access to the programs, copy-
right may be the most useful and efficient legal protection available for
computer programs. The National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) was created by Congress as part
of its effort to revise the United States copyright law.'61 CONTU's
function was to recommend changes in the copyright law to the Presi-
dent and Congress. These alternatives were to assure public access to
copyrighted works used with computers while respecting the rights of
the copyright owners in such works.' 62 The Commission noted that
two trends have created a need to extend legal safeguards to computer
programs: first, computers have become smaller and less expensive in
recent years, enabling many people to have computers in their homes
and offices, and second, many computer programs can be used on more
than one computer, 61 permitting widespread copying and use of pro-
grams. Without some type of legal protection against another's dupli-
cation and distribution of the programs, people are reluctant to
produce computer programs. The Commission concluded that copy-
right protection should be available for computer programs' 64 and data
bases.
165
ommended copyright protection for computer programs, CONTU, supra note 135, at 29,
and a summary of the Commission proposals has been introduced by Rep. Robert Kas-
tenmeier (D. Wis.) as the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, H.R. 6934,96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. H2263 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1980).
161. CONTU, supra note 135, at 1.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 24.
164. Id. at 29. In reaching these conclusions, the Commission compared copyright to
patent and trade secret protection, id. at 40-47, discussed the difficulties in obtaining patent
protection, id. at 41-42, as well as the inherent limitations of trade secret protection, Id. at
43-44, and thus recommended copyright protection as the most appropriate alternative.
165. Id. at 94. A data base is "the physical representation of information in some type of
organized, organizable, or unorganized computer-readable form. For example, it may be a
list of a corporation's customers, organized perhaps alphabetically by name or by geo-
graphic area, or volume of business, etc. The data base is input to the computer," and may
be altered, as occurs when customers not ordering goods within the last year are dropped
from the list; or unaltered, as occurs when the data base is used to print mailing labels.
BENDER, § 2.06[l], supra note 15, at 2-112 to 2-113 (1979). For a discussion of the Commis-
sion's analysis and conclusions regarding data bases, see CONTU, supra note 135, at 94-104.
The Commission indicated that data bases are protected under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1976), which provides in part that "[c]opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
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The Commission explained that the Constitution gives Congress
the power to grant authors exclusive rights in their writings,1 66 and that
the word "Writing" in the Constitution has been given a "broad and
dynamic meaning"' 161 in case law. A computer program is created the
same way that a novel, poem, play, musical score, blueprint, advertise-
ment, or telephone directory is created-by placing symbols in a me-
dium. All of these works are eligible for copyright protection under the
Constitution; computer programs should be eligible for the same pro-
tection. 168
The CONTU Report mentioned that Congress had included in the
Copyright Act 169 a section specifying that the same copyright protec-
tion for computer works exists in the new law as had existed in the
old. 170 However, the nature of the prior protection is unclear. While
the Register of Copyrights has accepted computer programs for copy-
right protection since 1964, this determination has never been chal-
lenged.17' To clarify the availability and scope of copyright protection,
the Commission recommended several statutory changes to the copy-
right law. It recommended that section 101 be amended to add this
definition: "A computer program is a set of statements or instructions
to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result."'172 It also recommended that section 117173 be repealed
and replaced with a new section that would allow the rightful possessor
of a computer program to protect the program by making archival cop-
ies and to adapt the program so that it can be used on the possessor's
computer. 
174
The Commission suggested that computer programs should be
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." CONTU, supra note 135, at
94. The Commission found that 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976) prohibits the unauthorized copying
or input of a data base embodied in a computer-readable medium. Id. at 95.
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides: "The Congress Shall have Power... [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
167. CONTU, supra note 135, at 35. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546
(1973) (sound recordings); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (lamp base statuettes); Kalem
Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (motion pictures); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (photographs).
168. CONTU, supra note 135, at 36.
169. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976 & 1978 Supp.).
170. CONTU, supra note 135, at 21 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976)).
171. Id. at 38-39. The Register required that human readable copies of the program be
submitted for registration. Id. at 38.
172. Id. at 30.
173. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976).
174. CONTU, supra note 135, at 30. The suggested section provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 106, it is not an infringement for the rightful
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safeguarded in all of their possible forms, including, but not limited to,
a human-readable listing of the computer instructions, a magnetic tape
or disk recording of the program, or a copy in the computer's mem-
ory.17  Copyright protection was also recommended for the different
forms in which a program may be represented, such as flowcharts,
76
source codes, 77 and object codes. 178 Such protection would prohibit
users from taking the writings of others to operate their machines with-
out obtaining the copyright owner's permission. One would remain
free to make the computer perform the same function as it would with
the copyrighted work, but only through creative effort, not piracy.
VI. EVIDENCE
Problems of admissibility of computer printouts in judicial pro-
ceedings may arise because of rules against admitting hearsay evi-
dence. 179  Computer evidence, however, may qualify for admission
under a business record exception'80 to the hearsay rule. Under this
possessor of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utiliza-
tion of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used
in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the com-
puter program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may be
leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such copies
were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the
program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization
of the copyright owner.
175. Id. at 55-56. In a recent case, the plaintiff had marketed a computerized chess game,
in which the computer progra m was part of the computer's circuitry. The defendant copied
the circuitry and marketed a competing game. The court held that the copied circuitry did
not violate the Copyright Act because one could not see and read the copy. Data Cash Sys.,
Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065-69 (N.D. Ill. 1979), a'don other grounds,
No. 80-1085 (7th Cir. Sept. 2, 1980).
176. CONTU, supra note 135, at 53. A flowchart is defined as "a graphic representation
for the definition, analysis or solution of a problem in which symbols are used to represent
operations, data flow, or equipment." Id. at 53 n.126.
177. Id. at 53. A source code is defined as "a computer program written in any of several
programming languages employed by computer programmers." Id. at 53 n.127.
178. Id. at 53-54. An object code is defined as "the version of a program in which the
source code language is converted or translated into the machine language of the computer
with which it is to be used." Id. at 54 n.128.
179. BENDER § 6.02[5], supra note 15. See generally Jacobson, The Use of Computer
Printouts as Evidence in Commercial Litigation, 82 CoM. L.J. 14 (1977). California provides
that hearsay evidence is "evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness
testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted." CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1200 (West 1979).
180. The California business record exception states:
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exception, computer maintained business records are admissible if it
can be shown that "the criteria for the admission of non-computer
maintained business records have been met [and] the court finds that
reliable computer equipment and techniques have been used."' 81 It is
necessary to understand the foundation required to admit computer
printouts into evidence. An analysis of the cases discussing this ques-
tion reveals that many foundational requirements relate both to com-
puter produced records and non-computer produced records, while
some prerequisites apply specifically to computer produced records.' 82
A. General Foundation Requirements
1. Personal knowledge of the foundation witness
The majority of courts, which addressed whether the foundation
witness must have personal knowledge'8 3 of the act or event recorded,
Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove the act, condition, or event
if-
(a) the writing was made in the regular course of a business;
(b) the writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event;
(c) the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of
its preparation; and
(d) the sources of information and method and time of preparation were such as
to indicate its trustworthiness.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1271 (West 1979). The Federal Rules of Evidence similarly provide that
the following shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from informa-
tion transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activ-
ity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by
the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of infor-
mation or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not con-
ducted for profit.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
181. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR
MULTIPLE LITIGATION, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 2.716 (1977). It must be
noted, however, that the admissibility of computer printouts, as well as all other evidence, is
contingent upon a finding of relevance and materiality. See FED. R. EVID. 401 & 402.
182. See Monarch Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Genser, 383 A.2d 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1977), and cases cited therein.
183. According to general principles governing testimonial evidence regarding recorded
entries, the person whose statement is received as testimony should speak from personal
observation or knowledge. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1530, at 449 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
Is the personal knmwledge requirement satisfied if the facts are personally known to another,
but not to the entrant? It is concluded that
where an entry is made by one person in the regular course of business, recording
an oral or written report, made to him by other persons in the regular course of
business, of a transaction lying in the personal knowledge of the latter persons,
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have rejected this common law requirement.1 84 The remaining founda-
tional requirements concern the accuracy of the computer records
themselves.1 5
2. Qualifications of the foundation witness
All of the cases that have discussed the qualifications of a founda-
tion witness have involved statutes or case law describing the type of
witness required.'86 Some courts have required that the supervisor of
computer operations testify, 18 7 while other courts have been less strin-
gent, permitting an employee of the company who maintains the
records and is familiar with the records to testify.' 8 One court noted
that the jurisdiction did n6t require the custodian of the records, or
other equivalent witness, to testify as long as whoever testifies is able to
provide the foundational information required.8 9 The witness should
be familiar with the way the computer printout was generated to be
able to satisfy the court that the sources of information and time of
preparation show that the evidence is trustworthy.'
90
there is no objection to receiving that entry under the present exception, verified by
the testimony of the former person only, or of a superior who testifies to the regular
course of business, provided the practical inconvenience of producing on the stand
the numerous other persons thus concerned would in the particular case outweigh
the probable utility of doing so.
Id. at 451 (emphasis omitted).
184. One reason for rejecting the personal knowledge requirement is that because of em-
ployee transiency and the time span covered in the business records, it may be impossible to
locate the person(s) having personal knolwedge of the events described in the computer
record. Monarch Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Genser, 383 A.2d 475, 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1977).
185. The major justification for the hearsay exclusion is that the truth of the out-of-court
statement cannot be verified through cross-examination. BENDER § 6.0112], supra note 15.
186. Monarch Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Genser, 383 A.2d 475, 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1977), and cases cited therein.
187. Railroad Comm'n v. Southern Pac. R.R., 468 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1971).
188. Bobbie Brooks, Inc. v. Hyatt, 239 N.W.2d 782, 784-85 (Neb. Sup. Ct. 1976) (present
custodian, rather than custodian at the time the records originally were made, allowed to
testify).
189. Monarch Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Genser, 383 A.2d 475, 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1977). The relevant New Jersey statute provides:
A writing offered as a memorandum or record of acts, conditions or events is ad-
missible to prove the facts stated therein if the writing or the record upon which it
is based was made in the regular course of business, at or about the time of the act,
condition or event recorded, and if the sources of information from which it was
made and the method and circumstances of its preparation were such as to justify
its admission.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A, Rule 63(13) (West 1976).
190. See Monarch Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Genser, 383 A.2d 475, 485-86 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
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3. Computer records made in the ordinary course of business
The requirement that computer records be made in the ordinary
course of business necessitates a showing that the computer records
were routinely prepared, 91 rather than prepared just for trial. 192 The
proponent of the evidence must further show that the printouts are re-
lied on by the company as sufficiently accurate for business pur-
poses. 193
In one case in which it was argued that the computer printout was
inadmissible because it was prepared for use in litigation, the Nebraska
Supreme Court said that the argument exalted form over substance.
While it was true that the printout was made for trial, the taped record
from which the printout came was made in the usual course of busi-
ness. 194
4. Time of entry
Under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, the entry
must be made at or about the time of the act. 195 This requirement is
satisfied if the input is made reasonably contemporaneously with the
occurrence of the events to which the printout relates. 196 In a Nebraska
Supreme Court case it was held that this requirement was satisfied
when the foundation witness testified that "the events contained in the
record were recorded within 1 week of their occurrence in the regular
course of business." 19
7
It is immaterial when the computer printout itself was made. In
one case, the printout was made several months after the information
was fed into the computer. The Sixth Circuit rejected the claim "that
the computer printout should not have been received in evidence be-
cause it was not prepared at the time the acts which it purports to de-
scribe were performed or within a reasonable time thereafter."'' 98 The
court stated that the computer printout is just a presentation in compre-
191. See, e.g., United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir. 1977) (disputed
printouts found to be drug analyses computerized routinely in the regular course of busi-
ness); King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393, 398 (Miss. 1969);
Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 132 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Neb. 1965).
192. D&H Auto Parts, Inc. v. Ford Mktg. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 548, 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
193. See id.; BENDER § 6.0114], supra note 15.
194. Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 132 N.W.2d 871, 875 (Neb. 1965).
195. See note 180 supra.
196. BENDER § 6.0114], supra note 15; Department of Mental Health v. Bell, 357 N.E.2d
875, 880 (I]. Ct. App. 1976).
197. Bobbie Brooks, Inc. v. Hyatt, 239 N.W.2d 782, 785 (Neb. 1976).
198. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1240 (6th Cir. 1973).
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hensible form of what is maintained on the magnetic tape, and that it
would be unjustly severe to require that the printout, as well as the
input on which it was based, must be produced at or within a reason-
able time after each act or transaction to which it relates. 199 The rea-
sonable time requirement, then, applies only to the input of the data
and not to the printout.
5. Meaning of computer printout
The foundation witness must offer a thorough explanation of the
meaning and identity of the computer printout.2° In Transport Indem-
nity Co. v. Seib,2° ' which involved an action for insurance premiums,
the proffered printouts showed accidents by date, name of driver, type
of accident, amount and type of loss, and various expenses and infor-
mation from which the premium could be computed. The foundation
witness directed the insurance company's accounting department, and
the records in question were under his custody and control. He pro-
vided a detailed explanation of each item of information in the
printout, thus satisfying the yrequirement that the meaning and identity
of the printout be established.2 °2
B. Foundation Requirements Spec fc to Computers
Admissibility is dependent on a showing that the computer pro-
grams were performing properly. The procedures used for testing their
accuracy and reliability must be presented to the court.2 °3 In Transport
Indemnity, the computer program used a mathematical formula to
compute insurance premiums based on a percentage of gross monthly
receipts. The foundation witness performed hand calculations that es-
tablished that the machine-generated results were accurate.2°4
The foundation witness additionally must describe the flow of in-
formation into and out of the computer. In King v. State ex rel. Mur-
dock Acceptance Corp.,205 a question arose whether certain
computerized accounting records were admissible. The records were
admitted after extensive testimony by the foundation witness under
199. Id.
200. Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 132 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Neb. 1965); People v. Gauer,
288 N.E.2d 24, 25 (111. Ct. App. 1972).
201. 132 N.W.2d 871 (Neb. 1965).
202. Id. at 873-74.
203. Monarch Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Genser, 383 A.2d 475, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1977); United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir. 1977).
204. 132 N.W.2d at 874.
205. 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969).
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whose supervision the computerized records were maintained. The
witness testified that the accounting was done using a Burroughs B-280
computer, which is standard equipment recognized as an efficient and
reliable machine. The information was keypunched by experienced
operators and verified by another operator. If a card had been punched
incorrectly, it would not have gone through the verifying machine. The
cards were fed into the computer and the information was stored on
tape.20 6 It must also be established that the computer operator 20 7 un-
derstood the operation of the computer and ran it properly before the
evidence can be admitted.2 08 Furthermore, it must be shown that the
input data was in a format anticipated by the programs. 2 9
Courts have been willing to assume that the computer functioned
properly unless evidence to the contrary is presented by the opponent
of the computer evidence.2 0 Computer hardware malfunctions, how-
ever, do occur and may be the source of incorrect output.21' The com-
puter system may consist of the computer and various peripheral units
for input, storage, and output. There may be card readers, magnetic
tape drives, keyboard input devices, optical scanning devices, printers,
graph plotters, disc storage, drum storage, and various other devices.
212
Any of these can fail.213 Equipment maintenance records may be an
effective way of determining whether the equipment was in good work-
ing order at the time the information in question was processed.
21 4
Human error in programming, preparing the data for processing, or
operating the machine are likely sources of inaccuracy.215 While the
206. Id. at 396-97.
207. The computer operator is the person who operates the computer, who inputs the
information to be processed, and who removes the output. MEEK, supra note 2, at 159. It
should not be assumed that the computer operator performed correctly. The operator may
have used the wrong magnetic tape, punched wrong buttons on the computer, or otherwise
run the computer improperly.
208. United States v. DeGeorgia, 420 F.2d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 1969) (Ely, J., concurring);
United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1241 (6th Cir. 1973). See Railroad Comm'n v.
Southern Pac. R.R., 468 S.W.2d 125, 129 (rex. Ct. Civ. App. 1971).
209. For example, if a program expected that the first piece of information on the
keypunched card was a numerical representation of the month of purchase, and the second
piece of information was the price, problems could arise if these were reversed. BENDER
§ 2.04(3], supra note 15. See also id. § 2.051]; Freed, supra note 5, at 25.
210. United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Russo,
480 F.2d 1228, 1239-40 (6th Cir. 1973).
211. See BENDER § 2.05[6], supra note 15.
212. See generally id. § 2.05 for descriptions of these items.
213. See Freed, supra note 5, at 25.
214. See R. FREED, COMPUTERS AND THE LAW 216 (4th ed. 1973) (the maintenance con-
tract of the General Services Administration requires written maintenance reports).
215. BENDER § 2.05[6], supra note 15, at 2-100 n.261.
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percentage of hardware errors in computer operations is very low, the
number of hardware errors can be significant because of the great
number of discrete operations performed by a computer.21 6
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has been an attempt to familiarize attorneys with com-
puters and some of the law relating to them. No attempt has been
made to create experts in computer law. If after reading this article
attorneys are able to identify problems and provide assistance to their
clients on the basis of the research presented here, then the article has
achieved a valuable result.
216. Id. § 2.0516], at 2-100.
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